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This paper argues against a natural resource curse for human development. We find evidence 
that changes in human development from 1970 to 2005, proxied by changes in the Human 
Development Index, are positively and significantly correlated with natural resource abundance. 
While our results are consistent with those of other authors who have recently argued that natural 
resources do not adversely affect growth, we find strong evidence that natural resources have a 
positive effect on human development and particularly on its non-income dimensions. However, 
results from Latin America interactions show that the positive impact of natural resources in this 
region is significantly smaller than in the rest of the world. These results contribute to a broader 
discussion about the “resource curse” by showing that natural resources may be a blessing rather 
than a curse for human development, primarily through its effects on education and health rather 
than income. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports.   1 
1. Introduction 
It is paradoxical to think that natural resource riches hurt rather than help an endowed country. 
Yet this is precisely the argument that has permeated academic and policy circles for decades. A 
plethora of papers containing empirical analyses, game theoretic models, and case studies has 
appeared, attempting to explain why natural resources could be bad for economic growth and 
development. Some of the more popular explanations involve the Dutch Disease, economic 
volatility, rent-seeking, and  weak institutions, all of which are argued to negatively impact 
growth. 
However, with new empirical evidence and deeper probing into the causes of growth collapse, 
doubt has begun to build regarding a causal relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth. A growing literature has arisen involving those who do not subscribe to the theory of a 
natural resource curse or who believe in a conditional curse. Many success stories have arisen 
from natural resource wealth. Norway has long utilized its Petroleum Fund to stabilize its oil 
wealth, providing economic security for the country. More recently, Chile’s Copper Stabilization 
Fund has proven to be a successful element in the country’s economic recovery since the mid 
1980s. In both cases, resource dependence presented challenges that were properly managed, 
resulting in economic prosperity. Key challenges in the literature involve disentangling the effect 
of natural resources from those of other factors which may be correlated with resource 
abundance but independently affect growth, distinguishing between the direct role that natural 
resources may play in affecting progress and the way in which it may interact with other 
determinants, and identifying exogenous sources of variation in resource abundance. 
Recent studies have highlighted major differences between performance as measured by the 
yardstick of economic growth and human development.
1
                                                           
1 See Rodríguez(2009), Binder and Georgiadis (2010) and Gray and Purser (2009).  Some of 
these points were raised earlier by Easterly(1999)  
  In particular, there is no significant 
correlation between per capita income growth and changes in the non-income components of 
human development, even over relatively long periods of time (up to four decades).  While 
growth was stagnant for the poorest regions like Africa, adult literacy more than doubled and 
enrolment rates increased by 72 percent over the same period.  If countries’ performance in   2 
growth and human development can be so disparate, one might also expect there to be 
differences in their correlates.  
Building on the empirical and theoretical work done by Daniel Lederman and William F. 
Maloney (2008), this paper argues against a natural resource curse not only with respect to GDP 
growth but most importantly for other dimensions of human development. We show that changes 
of human development from 1970 to 2005, proxied by changes in the Human Development 
Index, are positively and significantly correlated with natural resource abundance. While our 
results are consistent with those of Lederman and Maloney, who find natural resources to be 
possibly positive for growth, we find strong evidence that natural resources are even better for 
the human development.  This is particularly true for the non-income elements of human 
development. 
This article also takes a close look at the Latin American case. Resource abundance has often 
been singled out as one of the culprits for the region’s poor development.  On the other hand, as 
we will discuss in the next section, there are quite a few cases in which resources have coexisted 
with strong performance in the region.  Are natural resources harming Latin America’s 
development prospects?  Anticipating our results, we find evidence that the human development 
– enhancing effect of natural resources is lower in Latin America than in the rest of the world, 
suggesting that Latin America may not be fully taking advantage of the possibilities deriving 
from its factor endowments.  
In Tables 1a-b, we present selected summary statistics of the main data we use in this paper, 
subdivided by countries that are net exporters and net importers of natural resources.
2
                                                           
2 These are countries that export (import) more than the average. 
  Table 1a 
shows that compared with all countries, net importers have higher levels in HDI as well as in all 
of its components.  However, looking at changes in variables reveals a somewhat different 
scenario. Changes in life expectancy are roughly the same across all country groupings. GDP 
growth has been smaller for net exporter countries, which is at the heart of the natural curse 
hypothesis. However, changes in the non-income component of HDI, primarily associated with 
literacy and gross enrolment, are on average larger for net exporting countries. Results are even 
stronger, in the comparison of changes, if we focus on  the high net exporters and high net   3 
importers. As we can see from Table 1.b, all changes are greater for net exporters than net 
importers except for per capita GDP growth. This potentially indicates that natural resources 
affect human development primarily through channels other than income.  
Table 1a. Summary Statistics: Mean of variables (All countries 1980-2005)  
 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 1b. Summary Statistics: Mean of variables (High net exporters/importers 1980-2005) 
 
Note: High Net Exporters/Importers refer s to countries that are exporting/importing more than the average. 
Source: Own calculations 
All countries Net Exporters Net Importers All countries Net Exporter Net Importer
HDI 0.7337 0.7102 0.7685 0.0045 0.0043 0.0047
108 57 51 108 57 51
non-income HDI 0.7594 0.7321 0.7899 0.0054 0.0056 0.0052
110 58 52 110 58 52
GDP/capita 8.67 8.5141 8.8282 0.0153 0.0097 0.021
141 71 70 141 71 70
Life Expectancy 67.9206 65.5284 70.3446 0.3059 0.3033 0.3085
151 76 75 151 76 75
Gross Enrolment  0.7143 0.6935 0.7377 0.0066 0.007 0.0063
115 61 54 115 61 54
Literacy 0.8269 0.8142 0.8397 0.0062 0.0068 0.0057
140 70 70 140 70 70
Levels Changes
All countries High Net Exporters High Net Importers All countries High Net Exporters High Net Importers
HDI 0.7337 0.8371 0.8869 0.0045 0.0043 0.0042
108 29 25 108 29 25
non-income HDI 0.7594 0.844 0.8904 0.0054 0.0055 0.0042
110 29 25 110 29 25
GDP/capita 8.67 9.427 9.6968 0.0153 0.0107 0.0254
141 37 35 141 37 35
Life Expectancy 67.9206 72.4482 75.4347 0.3059 0.3203 0.2858
151 38 38 151 38 38
Gross Enrolment  0.7143 0.8045 0.8379 0.0066 0.007 0.0059
115 30 26 115 30 26
Literacy 0.8269 0.8992 0.948 0.0062 0.0059 0.0035
140 36 34 140 36 34
Levels Changes  4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of the 
effect  of natural resources  on development:  the theoretical arguments,  different  channels  of 
impact, and why natural resources might not be a curse after all. Section 2 contains a special 
discussion that focuses on a comparative analysis of different growth experiences of Latin 
America and the rest of the world with respect to natural resources. Section 3 presents our data 
and empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses our results, which find natural resources to be 
positively correlated with human development. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Broadly speaking, the resource curse literature has highlighted five channels  through which 
growth may affect human development: Dutch Disease, volatility, trade structure, depletion, and 
rent-seeking, all of which are complicated by institutional weakness.  We discuss each of these in 
turn.  
The term ‘Dutch Disease’ was initially coined to describe the observed collapse of the Dutch 
manufacturing sector following the discovery of natural gas in 1959.
3
Sachs and Warner (1995)’s empirical work brought this issue to the front line of the development 
debate. They showed that countries with a high ratio of natural resources to GDP in their base 
year, 1970, grew more slowly over the next two decades than their resource-scarce counterparts. 
Their analysis is cross-sectional, using the share of GNP in 1970 consisting of primary products 
to define natural resource abundance, and controlling for other potential growth determinants 
such as economic openness, rule of law and growth of external terms of trade and found a robust  
negative relationship between natural resources and growth.  
   Corden (1984) first 
modelled this effect.  His basic model shows how capital moves away from non-oil tradables as 
oil booms, weakening the overall economy. An influx of foreign capital to the booming resource 
sector causes an appreciation in the exchange rate. A higher exchange rate raises economy-wide 
prices, leading the non-resource tradable sectors to lose competitiveness abroad. 
                                                           
3 “The Dutch Disease” (November 26, 1977).  The Economist, pp. 82-83   5 
Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007) describe a related challenge of natural resource 
abundance and dependence: volatility. They view natural resources as assets with exceptional 
volatility.
4  World natural resource prices are historically volatile due to varying rates of 
extraction, and the nature  of contracts with multi-national  companies.  Stiglitz (2007)
5
The problems of volatility are exacerbated when an economy is overly dependent on the natural 
resource industry. Lederman and Maloney (2007)
  and 
Shaxson (2005) argue that the latter effect arises from multinationals coercing countries into 
bearing the brunt of the income variability.  Volatility  has many adverse effects, including 
making development planning difficult, social spending sporadic, and foreign investors wary. 
6
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) introduce a different channel through which natural resources can 
appear to damage growth: depletion.  Their model shows an underdeveloped country 
overshooting its steady state during a resource boom. After the initial rise in income, the growth 
rate turns negative, and the country converges to its steady state from above. Resource revenues 
consumed by the domestic economy will naturally decrease over time, tending to zero. In this 
way, after a country enjoys the resource boom, it negatively converges to its overshot steady 
state. Sachs and Warner’s (2005) empirical evidence support this model by finding a negative 
growth rate associated with natural resource abundance only after an increase in initial wealth. 
One important implication is that the observed negative growth is simply the reversion of the 
positive growth occurring immediately after the boom.  Therefore it is a depletion effect, rather 
than natural resources, that is responsible for the negative growth rates. Rodriguez and Sachs 
show that if an economy instead invests its windfall in foreign assets that generate a steady 
stream of revenue, a negative growth rate can be averted.  
 argue that a trade structure lacking export 
diversification hurts growth, not natural resources. To test this theory, they redo the Sachs and 
Warner analysis with the inclusion of variables for export concentration and intra-industry trade. 
Their findings demonstrate that any negative effect of natural resources on growth disappears in 
the presence of a variable capturing export concentration.  
                                                           
4 The book suggests that non-renewable natural resource should be viewed as assets rather than 
production.  
5 This is chapter 2 of Escaping the Resource Curse, by Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz. 
6 Ch. 2 of Neither Curse nor Destiny   6 
Another channel of particular relevance for natural resource abundant countries is the 
vulnerability to  external shocks and the different productive linkages that an  economy 
has. Hausmann, Rodríguez, and Wagner (2007) show that countries with lower export flexibility 
–  which they measure using an indicator of the density of the product space developed by 
Hausmann and Klinger(2006) have a harder time recovering from crises caused by export 
collapses, as it is more difficult for them to move productive resources to a new sector.  This is 
particularly relevant for resource abundant countries as many natural resources, such as oil, are 
found to occupy areas of low density in the product space. 
Jaime Ros (2000) illustrates a contrary case of resources enriching a country when sufficient 
industrial linkages exists.  In these cases, the spending of resource rents can actually have an 
anti-Dutch disease effect.  Two pieces of evidence supporting this thesis are the fact that in 
countries where natural resources are scarce, one observes stunted industrial development in 
areas that thrive in resource rich countries, and the fact that Latin America’s “primary export 
phase” was fueled by resource abundance.   When proper returns to scale existed in 
complementary industrial sectors, resource booms fueled major economic expansions. 
In the last decade, however, most of the blame for poor growth rates in resource dependent states 
has been put on institutional weaknesses. A number of these explanations actually emphasize 
institutional interactions: many have observed (Karl 1997, Lederman and Maloney 2007, Wright 
and Czelusta 2007) that natural resources have been huge economic boons for many countries 
while appearing not to have helped, or even possibly to have hurt, other countries, suggesting the 
existence of conditional factors which may be amplifying any effect of natural resources.  One 
logical suspect is institutions. 
Lane and Tornell (1999) note that under certain circumstances, point-source resources such as 
fuels and minerals intensify rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking, by nature, leads to perverse 
fiscal redistribution, inefficient capital projects, and corruption. Lane and Tornell identify two 
main exacerbating traits. The first is the absence of strong legal and political institutions. The 
second is the presence of multiple power groups, such as parasitic provincial governments, 
protection-seeking industrial centers and labor unions, and political patronage networks. These 
two situations create what Lane and Tornell call a “voracity effect,” where a large resource   7 
windfall will generate an increase in fiscal redistribution that is more than proportionate, thereby 
reducing growth. Guerrilla uprisings in Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru, 
as well as Native American riots in Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, and Brazil, are examples. Di John 
(2009) explains that these are all the result of rival political groups using non-market methods to 
capture resource rents, another manifestation of the voracity effect. 
Karl (1997) examines  the  nature of petro-state institutions  in detail.    She finds parallel 
institutions among rent-centered states, whether they be Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi-Arabia, or 
even 16
th century Spain. In almost all cases, the state is the direct recipient of the rent wealth, 
which diminishes the need for taxation.  Without taxation, the nature of the social contract 
between the government and citizens is eroded, while the state can expand its own jurisdiction. 
The state’s primary purpose becomes spending. Success for businesses, labor organizations, and 
the middle-class is redefined as the ability to gain or curry political influence.  
A significant finding unique to Karl’s analysis is that the major failed petro-states, Nigeria, 
Algeria, Iran, and Venezuela, all had one defining characteristic: they developed their institutions 
at the same time that petroleum was discovered and multi-national oil companies entered the 
picture. In many cases, the oil companies helped write the tax laws, and countries’ institutions 
formed around patronage and oil politics. In almost all cases, the state was the direct recipient of 
the rent wealth. Maloney (2007) shows that this led to a lack of interest in developing other 
industries, as demonstrated even in gold and silver rich 16
th century Spain. What resulted in 
Spain’s case similarly developed for these other petro-states: a type of “cultural Dutch Disease.”  
Further work by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) shows a direct causal relationship 
between natural resources and weak institutions. They theorize that natural resources influence 
growth indirectly through institutions. This would account for the lack of significance for the 
natural resource variable found in many analyses.  Regressing natural resources directly on 
institutions produced surprisingly strong results. Even when a dummy for oil is included, the 
impact on institutions is still significantly negative. In fact, they find that once institutions have 
been controlled for, oil actually has a beneficial effect on growth.    8 
Wantchenkon (2000) empirically demonstrates a causal relationship between natural resources 
and authoritarianism, finding that natural resources negatively impact democracy. Wantchenkon 
postulates that authoritarianism arises due to one-party dominance combined with weak rule of 
law. This incites the opposition to use non-constitutional means to compete for political power. 
In response, the incumbent pre-empts this move by repressing or banning the opposition party. 
However, when the rule of law is strong and political power is less concentrated, and distribution 
of resource rents is properly monitored by an independent agency, the incumbent’s advantage is 
largely mitigated. This can be seen in Norway’s case.
7 His empirical results show no impact on 
democracy from natural resources in countries where resource dependence is low (10% or less). 
However, when resource dependence is high (90% or more), a one percentage point increase in 
resource dependence leads to democracy index dropping 2.15%.
8
There are some cases where countries with weak institutions have enjoyed strong growth. Haber, 
Razo, Maurer (2003) investigate one such case. From 1876 to 1911, Mexican dictator Porfirio 
Diaz employed a system of selective property rights that were quite effective.  The scheme 
secured protection for the economic elites but not for the masses. In fact, this system survived the 
18 years of bloody civil war following Díaz’s demise, allowing for healthy growth despite the 
existence of a failed state. Haber et al argue that an oil exporting country’s government need not 
secure credible commitments to everyone.  As long as government can make credible 
commitments to the privileged elites and companies responsible for the majority of economic 
activity, it is not necessarily imperative for property rights and beneficial institutions to extend to 
the population as a whole. While securing rights for the entire population is often viewed as a 
prerequisite for full development, the authors show that substantial growth can be obtained 
simply by securing property rights for the major oil companies, which requires “neither rule of 
law nor a stable polity.”  
Nevertheless, the literature has 
failed to uncover a significant effect of democracy on growth, so that this is unlikely to be a 
major channel of transmission. 
A number of policies have been suggested to help alleviate any negative effects associated with 
natural resources. van Wijnbergen (1984) shows that government investment in human capital 
                                                           
7 Haber and Menaldo (2009) reject Watchenkon’s findings. 
8 This uses 1998 data.   9 
and industries intense in learning-by-doing spillovers will adequately protect a non-resource 
sector from Dutch Disease effects. Karl (1997) argues that resource dollars must be isolated from 
the domestic economy by such means as investing internationally, accumulating foreign 
reserves, and paying off foreign debts. Wantchekon (2000) similarly recommends a “resource 
fund,”  modelled  on Norway’s stabilization fund, as a way to keep resource money from 
negatively impacting an economy. Collier and Bevan (1996) recommend distributing the revenue 
directly to the citizenry. Revenue would then be obtained through taxing the citizenry rather than 
directly through resource rents. This, the authors argue, ensures greater wealth distribution while 
making the government more accountable to its taxpayers. Martin (2007)
9
With more data available and more sophisticated econometric techniques, it has become easier to 
tease out the true causes of economic collapse. Lederman and Maloney (2008) examine and 
critique the previous literature.  They criticize Sachs’ and Warner’s proxy for resource 
abundance: exports as a share of GDP. For countries such as Singapore, this proxy shows bloated 
natural resource endowments, as large quantities of resources move through their ports. Sachs 
and Warner recognize this, and for two countries they used a different proxy:  net resource 
exports as a share of GDP. Lederman and Maloney question why this metric wasn’t used for all 
countries in their sample instead of just for these two countries. To some degree, resources move 
through all countries and therefore are incorrectly counted toward the proxy. 
 states that policies 
moving away from concentration in primary resource exports should be taken only if there are 
clear market failures arising from the overconcentration and if feasible alternative policies are 
actually available. Assuming a country would not choose to ignore its natural resource wealth, 
four options remain for diversifying exports.  These include:  raising levels of physical and 
human capital; increasing the competitiveness of other industries; lowering barriers to trade, and 
reducing transportation and communication costs. 
Lederman and Maloney (2008) show that when either proxy is used for all countries, the 
negative effect of natural resources found by Sachs and Warner vanishes. Additionally, Sala-i-
Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) find that the Sachs and Warner proxy lacks sufficient 
                                                           
9 Ch. 11 of Neither Curse nor Destiny.   10 
robustness to be considered as a core explanatory variable.
10  Lederman and Maloney show that 
after controlling for fixed effects in a panel context, the negative effect of natural resources 
disappears. Finally, they find that adding an export concentration variable (the Herfindahl index) 
also eliminates the resource curse.
11
2.1 Latin America: a Regional Comparison 
 The general conclusion that Lederman and Maloney (2007, 
2008) draw from their analysis  is that natural resources are assets for development that 
necessitate  appropriate  policies and adequate human and physical capital.  They argue that 
countries can properly employ natural resources to create sustainable economic growth and 
development through proper export diversification, human and physical capital investment, 
volatility and real exchange rate control.  
Venezuela’s case is arguably the best researched in Latin America, with numerous studies and 
extensive available data.  Venezuela’s experience with rent-rich resources began with strong 
growth but was followed by economic deterioration. Venezuela’s economy performed strongly 
in the first half of the 20
th century, boasting the highest growth rate in Latin America. After 
1980, however, the country’s economy deteriorated, with its non-oil sector growing one fourth 
the amount of Indonesia’s and one sixth that of Mexico’s. Rodríguez and Hausmann (2009) 
show that Venezuela’s non-oil economic activity is primarily confined to energy intensive 
industries, which exploit the same comparative advantage in oil, doing little to protect the 
economy from its overreliance on petroleum products. Rodríguez and Hausmann (2009) use the 
export flexibility measure of Hausmann and Klinger (2006) – which these authors term “open 
forests” to look for traits in Latin America’s petro-states, specifically Venezuela.  They observe 
that Venezuela has a strikingly low open forest level, even compared to its neighbors.  In 1980, 
at the start of Venezuela’s growth collapse, its open forest was 13.8% of the world average and 
15.7% of the South American average.  A comparison with Mexico’s higher level might help to 
explain Mexico’s partial resilience to falling oil prices in the 1980s.   
                                                           
10 The variable “fraction GDP in mining” ranked as the 12
th most robust explanatory variable. 
(Lederman and Maloney 2008). 
11 Due to our econometric analysis being closely based on the work by Lederman and Maloney, 
further discussion of their variables and technique is in a later section.   11 
Rodríguez and Hausmann point out that while Venezuela has a remarkably low open forest, this 
appears to be a common trait of oil-exporting countries.  Even after controlling for income, fuel-
exporters—those countries that have fuel make up over 80% of total exports—have an average 
open forest that is 2.17 log points lower than non-fuel exporters.  This implies that those inputs 
necessary for oil production have little value for producing other high-value exports. 
But Venezuela did not always do poorly with oil.  Rodríguez and Gomolin (2009) describe 
Venezuela's turn-of-the-century consolidation of economic, military, and political power, 
arguing that this was key to the country's success in developing the institutions for properly 
utilizing future oil revenue. At the turn of the century, before the discovery of oil, Venezuelan 
dictator  Cipriano Castro had  modernized the army, centralizing command  and suppressing 
dissent. An intricately woven web of political patronage backed this authority under Castro’s 
successor, Juan Vicente Gómez, when incentives  for political support were increased and 
expanded.  Thus Venezuela receives oil under a consolidated and centralized state. 
In stark contrast, Mexico failed to centralize and consolidate its national public finances in the 
early 20th century. The armed forces remained un-modernized as well. Total municipal revenues 
almost equalled federal revenues, which stood at 4% of GDP. Wealthy municipalities had access 
to military resources and posed the first challenges to the central government in the early 20th 
century.  With no set of centralized political and economic institutions in place, the influx of oil 
revenue following 1910 did not generate the growth spurt in Mexico that occurred in Venezuela.  
Di John (2009) studies the Venezuelan case from a political economy perspective. . Venezuela 
has enjoyed large oil revenues since 1920. Di John divides this 85-year span into two periods, 
each with its own polity type. From 1920 to 1968, Venezuela is described as a consolidated state 
with a centralized political organization. According to DiJohn, this type of polity could handle a 
big-push Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) development plan backed by resource rents, 
since patronage can be deployed through a one-party state backed by an organized military. After 
1968, however, the polity turned into what Di John calls a consolidated state with a fragmented 
political organization. This type of polity can handle only small scale ISI, for the high level of 
coordination necessary for big push ISI is not possible with such political friction. Therefore, Di   12 
John concludes, Venezuela began its economic decline due to the incompatibility of its 
development strategy with its changing polity type after 1968. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Argentina and Scandinavia enjoyed similar levels of wealth 
as well as similar levels of natural resources.  Maloney (2007) puts forward evidence that 
Argentina’s weak performance throughout the twentieth century stemmed from poor national 
learning and innovation systems, hindrances to technological adoption, and backward incentive 
structures arising from the protectionist era of ISI. This description could probably be extended 
to Latin America as a whole. Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, successfully developed 
with primary commodities.  They used their natural resources as catalysts for learning and 
technological innovation, as did countries like the United States and Australia. These countries 
combined an early emphasis on literacy and education with investments in positive spillover-
yielding, dynamic firms. These same firms developed into the high-tech companies that lead 
their respective industries today.  Even when Scandinavian countries had the same level of 
income as Latin America, their literacy rates were two times greater. By 1842, a mere decade 
after a mandatory school system was introduced; Sweden’s literacy rate was nearly 100 percent. 
The mixture of advanced education, knowledge clusters, industry financed research, and open 
economies are what distinguished Scandinavia from Latin America. As a result, Sweden and 
Finland have become case studies for successful development through natural resources. 
(Blomström and Kokko, 2007).  
Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio (2007) further explain the growth of disparity between different 
regions  of the world through the 20
th  century.  They look at kilometers of railway, primary 
enrolment, and literacy rates from 1870 to 1910 as signs of differing levels of physical and 
human capital. Latin America lagged in all three categories behind Europe, Canada, the United 
States, and Australia. Using the Sachs and Warner (1995) proxy for natural resources, they find 
that when the average level of education for a country reaches just three years, natural resources 
become positively correlated with growth. 
Latin American countries have had widely varying experiences with natural resources. Chile’s 
copper industry dominated the country’s economy for over 150 years, but a price boom from 
1965-177 did little for the Chilean economy. Instead, Chile’s economic acceleration began in   13 
1982 with currency devaluation, financial reform, pension reform, and privatization (Collier and 
Sater, 1996). In a similar vein, Caselli and Michaels (2009) perform an intra-country study of 
Brazil to show that resource-rich municipalities enjoyed little to no social benefit from their oil 
windfalls. Caselli and Michaels argue that this was primarily due to corruption and inefficient 
distribution. Aragón and Rud (2009), on the other hand, demonstrate a positive effect of natural 
resources on the local population. They find that Yanacocha, a Peruvian gold mine, improved 
local incomes and standards of living. They argued that these improvements were not the result 
of an increase in social spending. Instead, they said that the effects resulted from an increase in 
demand for local inputs.  
The oil boom of the 1970s resulted in the greatest reworking of the international economic 
landscape since the gold rush of the America’s in the 16
th century (Karl, 1997). The record influx 
of cash to petro-states led to oversized government ambition and public spending. Benefits of 
this spending included a massive expansion of public welfare, an increase in employment, and a 
rise in the standard of living. Middle-Eastern countries offered free healthcare, education, and 
extensive pensions. Latin American countries invested in job creation and subsidized housing 
and fuel. Petro-governments in both regions took advantage of their newly unrestricted capital 
immediately.  They embarked on massive spending campaigns, primarily involving capital-
intensive projects.  Viewing their oil as an exhaustible commodity, the governments spent 
rapidly.  
Issues emerged immediately. Bottlenecks in production and limited capacity in management and 
infrastructure led to delays, inefficiencies, and rising domestic prices. The appreciating currency 
and unprecedented levels of state spending produced Dutch Disease effects.  Local industry 
deteriorated, making the state even more dependent on petroleum.  State expenditures quickly 
outpaced the massive oil revenues even while income remained high. Foreign capital was easily 
accessible for the first time due to countries’ rent-derived collateral, but this led to a huge debt 
overhang. When prices dropped, petro-states were broke and unable to repay their loans. 
However, not all countries experienced the same difficulties with their natural resources: certain 
countries were able to employ natural resources to fuel unprecedented growth and development. 
Wright and Czelusta (2007) examine 19
th century United States and its success with natural   14 
resources.  Based on resource-fueled development, the United States overtook the United 
Kingdom in GDP per worker hour by 1890 and led the world in productivity by 1913.  In 
arguments parallel to those of Karl (1997) and Maloney (2007), Wright and Czelusta contrast the 
US with former Spanish colonies who lived passively off of their resource rents. The US 
developed an accommodating legal environment, undertook massive investments in 
infrastructure and knowledge, and promoted resource focused education. In doing so, the US was 
able to produce more metals more efficiently than many countries with far larger resource 
endowments.  Australia and Botswana provide further examples of successful resource-based 
growth. Australia created a knowledge intensive mineral sector that produces billions of dollars 
in intellectual property alone. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) showcase Botswana as 
one of sub-Saharan Africa’s lone  success cases, a  feat accomplished by combining good 
institutions with a thriving diamond-mining sector. 
In general, the literature suggests that natural resources can be an important part of the countries 
pain or prosperity. However, it would be wrong to unequivocally state that natural resources are 
the reason for a country’s woes. Instead, what the case studies suggest is that weak institutions 
and poor policies make countries vulnerable to the pitfalls presented by natural resources. 
Natural resources can also be a blessing, and some countries have used natural resources to fuel 
unprecedented growth and development.    
3. Data and empirical methodology 
Our empirical strategy is similar to that of Lederman and Maloney (2008), extended in two 
directions. First, we analyze the effect of natural resource abundance not only on per capita GDP 
growth but also on human development. Second, our sample goes from 1970 to 2005, given the 
newly available dataset of human development developed by Gray and Purser (2009). 
For measuring the natural resource wealth of countries, our primary explanatory variable, there 
are many possible proxies in the literature.  None is perfectly suited to the purpose of estimating 
coefficients in human development equations. Most scholars measure natural resources as the 
share of one or more of primary product exports, including agricultural raw materials, food, fuel, 
ores and metals to GDP (e.g.  Nunn, 2008; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004 and Leamer, 1999).   15 
However, most of the measures are not necessarily measures of resource abundance, but rather 
measures of dependence on natural resources. We use Lederman and Maloney’s measure of net 
exports, which applies the primary goods groups of Leamer (1999). Natural resource exports per 
worker is our indicators of resource abundance, to which we will refer as the direct effect of 
natural resources on human development.
12
However, as Lederman and Maloney recognize, there could be two flaws with this proxy, both 
related to consumption. First, income growth increases consumption, which could lead to a bias 
when estimating the relationship between net exports per labor and income.  There is clear 
empirical evidence of this, demonstrated by a positive correlation of exports and income among 
net exporters. There is even greater bias when non-resource related sectors cause this increase in 
income, resulting in a negative correlation of growth and exports. Second, an increase in imports 
and decrease in exports of natural resources is associated with a rise in capital endowments.
 A key advantage of this strategy is that this proxy, 
unlike other proxies, is positively correlated with natural resource endowment per worker. 
Additionally, it has the advantage of being a multi-commodity trade-based proxy, which allows 
for a larger coverage of countries.  
13
The following analysis centers on two types of regressions.
 Our baseline results are generated by 
running a typical OLS cross-country growth regression, which includes a convergence term, a 
proxy for the abundance of natural resources, a set of conditional variables, and regional 
dummies. While with the linear regression we can address the question “on average, are natural 
resources good for human development?” it cannot answer the other important question: “do 
natural resources influence human development differently for countries in Latin America?” For 
 To 
help solve these problems, they use an additional covariate:  imports of natural resources per 
worker, which will measure the indirect effect on natural resources on human development. 
While the coefficient of interest remains that of the export variable, the sum of the two 
coefficients  (the sum of the direct and indirect effect) measures the total effect of natural 
resources on human development. 
                                                           
12 Lederman and Maloney define net exports of natural resources as “exports minus imports of 
natural-resource-related goods, based on Leamer’s commodity clusters.” See appendix A for a 
full description of all variables.  
13 This relationship is extracted from the Rybczynski Theorem.    16 
this purpose, we also add to the previous regressions a set of regional dummies interactions and 
to check for any differential effect of natural resources among regions, particularly among Latin 
American countries. 
One issue that frequently arises with least squares estimations is the role of outliers, posing the 
question of how to treat some countries’ values that differ substantially from other countries’ 
observations. These deviations can tilt the regression line upwards or downwards,  and 
consequentially,  the results can be driven by them (see e.g.,  Rodríguez, 2007 and Easterly, 
2005). We thus estimate all our regressions eliminating these outliers. In order to do this, we use 
the dfbeta measure proposed by Besley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), an influence measure which 
identifiesthose observations with a significant impact on the results.
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4. Results 
 The dfbeta for a predictor 
and for a particular observation is the difference between the regression coefficient calculated for 
all of the data and the regression coefficient calculated with the observation deleted, scaled by 
the standard error calculated with the observation deleted.  
Tables 2.a – 2.e show the results of our panel regressions with HDI and its subcomponents 
changes  as the dependent variable and natural resource abundance as the key variables of 
interest. All tables include three specifications that contain a convergence variable in addition to 
the resource variables along with regional dummies. The second set of specifications, in column 
two, also contain terms of trade growth and.  We also have another set of specifications, in 
column three, which contain the institutional variable.  
OLS (Main results) 
In addition to the reported coefficients, significance levels, standard errors, and test statistics, we 
also calculated standardized regression coefficients in order to examine the relative importance 
of each variable for determining the growth (changes) in HDI. These so-called beta-coefficients 
                                                           
14 See also Cook and Weisberg (1982). We restrict our estimations to the cut-off value for the 
absolute value of  DFBETAs  being smaller than  2/sqrt(N), where N  is the number of 
observations.   17 
make the magnitude of each individual exogenous variable’s impact comparable by being unit-
free.  
Our OLS results indicate that natural resource abundance has a positive effect on human 
development, since the coefficients for the net exporters of natural resources are positive and 
statistically significant for all specifications. In analyzing the total effect of natural resources (the 
sum of the coefficients of net exports and total imports), we found that its effect is positive for 
both net resource exporting and importing countries, with the effect being stronger for net 
exporters, as shown by about twice as large standardized (beta) coefficients. Furthermore the 
statistical significance is more robust for the net exporters, as the total effect of natural resources 
in determining HDI is statistically significant across all three specifications. Such a consistent 
result across models was not found for net importers, for whom natural resources are significant 
only after the inclusion of terms of trade growth.  It is important to note that the coefficient for 
the net imports of natural resources is not significant in any regression. Also, for net importers, 
the indirect effect of natural resources (measured by the total imports per worker, M/L) is 
stronger than the direct effect (measured by the absolute value of their net exports of natural 
resources, NX/L), while for exporters the inverse holds true, indicating that the impacts of 
natural resources are mostly relevant in those countries where they are abundant. 
All three specifications include the initial HDI level of 1970 to test  for convergence. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficients of the initial HDI values of 1970 indicate that 
there is indeed convergence in human development. In fact the convergence term exerts more 
impact on human development and all of its subcomponents than any other explanatory variable, 
as we can see by comparing the absolute value of the beta coefficient.  
After convergence, net exports of natural resources is the second most important variable in 
explaining changes in HDI. An increase of the natural resources exported by net exporters by a 
factor equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 0.34 to 0.38 standard deviations increase in 
the change in HDI, depending on the model. This boost in HDI changes is only about one-ninth 
that of an equivalent increases by net importers, which implies that the effect of direct resource 
endowments is important only for net exporters. The reverse applies for indirect effects of   18 
natural resources, where only net natural resource importers demonstrate a significant response 
that is more than twice as strong as the insignificant beta coefficient for net exporters. 
The inclusion of the terms of trade growth and institutional variables did not change the joint 
significance or magnitude of the two natural resource variables for net exporters and net 
importers, as reflected by the F test for the sum of coefficients.  
We now turn to discussing the effects of natural resources on the components of the HDI.  
Natural resource abundance measures played a significant and positive role in all literacy 
models. In fact, both net export and net import as composite measures of the natural resources 
played a positive and significant role in the determination of literacy. The two other non-income 
HDI composites, gross enrolment and life expectancy show positive and significant relationships 
only for some specifications. For life expectancy, the joint effect is positive and mostly 
significant. Gross Enrolment was negatively and significantly affected by the indirect effect of 
natural resource endowments for exporters, an effect that is captured in the aggregation of the 
sum of both exporting coefficients. Both direct and indirect resource variables were negative for 
almost all specifications for importers. Only in one specification did natural resource abundance 
show a positive association with gross enrolment on a 10% significance level, and all but one 
sum of coefficients for either net exporters or importers showed a negative sign.  
Regarding the income HDI component, GDP  per  capita growth shows that natural resource 
abundance could be a blessing for growth. 
15
                                                           
15 This result is similar to that reported by Lederman and Maloney (2008), with the difference 
that our sample goes from 1970 to 2005. 
In comparing the GDP to the HDI results, we find 
that the latter is more conclusive in terms or the statistical significance of the direct effect of 
natural resource abundance. For both the HDI and GDP we find that resource abundance is more 
important for exporters than importers. However, in the case of GDP,  the  effect  of natural 
resources through total imports (the indirect effect) is stronger than the direct effect (through net 
export of natural resources). The standardized coefficients further show that the direct effect of 
natural resources (NX/L) is important for HDI (by a factor of almost two), while the indirect 
effect (M/L) is more important for GDP/capita (by a factor of around nine times more).   19 
The previous discussion is illustrated with the following figures (Figures 1 and 2), which show a 
less significant effect of natural resource abundance on GDP growth than on HDI, particularly on 
the non-income components. 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Own calculations.    20 
Figure 2 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
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Table 2.a: OLS results: Determinants of HDI change 
 
Table 2.b: OLS results: Determinants of GDP/capita growth 
 
Explanatory variables: coeff. Beta coeff. Beta coeff. Beta
Net Natural Resource Exports (pos NX/L) 0.000292*** 0.33981 0.000393*** 0.35913 0.000394*** 0.37969
[7.37e-05] [7.59e-05] [7.63e-05]
Net Natural Resource Imports (neg NX/L) 0.00006 0.05156 0.00014 0.09365 0.00006 0.04509
[0.000134] [0.000117] [0.000108]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Exporters (pos M/L) 0.00006 0.05358 0.000225* 0.18589 0.00010 0.08394
[0.000115] [0.000135] [0.000105]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Importers (neg M/L) 0.00022 0.12004 0.00035 0.15518 0.000373** 0.18974
[0.000167] [0.000221] [0.000177]
HDI in 1970 -0.0134*** -1.71018 -0.0159*** -1.78169 -0.0146*** -1.78237
[0.00236] [0.00149] [0.00161]
Terms of Trade Growth -0.00071 -0.00646 -0.0100* -0.09460
[0.00735] [0.00593]
Executive Constraint 0.00062 0.17232
[0.000455]
Sum of coefficients: 
pos NX/L + pos M/L 0.00035 0.39339 0.00062 0.54502 0.00049 0.4636242
   F test 6.63000 16.80000 15.90000
   p value 0.01250 0.00010 0.00020
neg NX/L + neg M/L 0.000287 0.17159 0.00049 0.24883 0.00043 0.2348335
   F test 2.29000 6.70000 7.06000
   p value 0.13520 0.01240 0.01070
Observations 73 66 61
R-squared 0.79 0.865 0.888
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) Growth refers to annual average growth in the period 1970 - 2005; (2) Regional Dummies are included in all specifications. 
Explanatory variables: coeff. Beta coeff. Beta coeff. Beta
Net Natural Resource Exports (pos NX/L) 0.00170 0.16956 0.00198** 0.18609 0.00093 0.10190
[0.00104] [0.000959] [0.00111]
Net Natural Resource Imports (neg NX/L) 0.00064 0.04772 0.00036 0.02928 0.00011 0.00989
[0.00135] [0.00112] [0.00144]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Exporters (pos M/L) 0.00769*** 0.66068 0.00751*** 0.63625 0.00581*** 0.58137
[0.00138] [0.00139] [0.00192]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Importers (neg M/L) 0.00934*** 0.53767 0.0101*** 0.60918 0.00659** 0.44100
[0.00158] [0.00164] [0.00266]
ln GDP/capita in 1970 -0.0158*** -1.01210 -0.0136*** -0.91855 -0.0102*** -0.78807
[0.00214] [0.00245] [0.00280]
Terms of Trade Growth -0.129*** -0.16614 -0.08490 -0.13258
[0.0479] [0.0541]
ln Executive Constraint 0.00406 0.15532
[0.00383]
Sum of coefficients: 
pos NX/L + pos M/L 0.00939 0.83024 0.00949 0.82234 0.00674 0.68327
   F test 45.92000 39.75000 7.77000
   p value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00740
neg NX/L + neg M/L 0.009976 0.58538 0.01046 0.63846 0.00670 0.45089
   F test 50.68000 62.29000 5.68000
   p value 0.00000 0.00000 0.02070
Observations 85 78 68
R-squared 0.78 0.802 0.753
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) Growth refers to annual average growth in the period 1970 - 2005; (2) Regional Dummies are included in all specifications.   22 
 
Table 2.c: OLS results: Determinants of Change in Literacy Ratio 
 
   
Explanatory variables: coeff. Beta coeff. Beta coeff. Beta
Net Natural Resource Exports (pos NX/L) 0.000466*** 0.17814 0.000521*** 0.16870 0.000634*** 0.20423
[0.000158] [0.000179] [0.000198]
Net Natural Resource Imports (neg NX/L) 0.00011 0.02773 0.00006 0.01604 0.00012 0.02780
[0.000214] [0.000222] [0.000210]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Exporters (pos M/L) 0.00021 0.06877 0.000438** 0.13132 0.000705*** 0.21182
[0.000224] [0.000212] [0.000237]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Importers (neg M/L) 0.00112*** 0.22469 0.00128*** 0.22706 0.00151*** 0.25711
[0.000282] [0.000354] [0.000394]
Literacy in 1970 -0.0137*** -0.94903 -0.0161*** -1.02477 -0.0167*** -1.03237
[0.00156] [0.00132] [0.00136]
Terms of Trade Growth 0.00351 0.01442 -0.01330 -0.05828
[0.00984] [0.0108]
Executive Constraint -0.00108 -0.11603
[0.000680]
Sum of coefficients: 
pos NX/L + pos M/L 0.00068 0.24691 0.00096 0.30002 0.00134 0.41605
   F test 6.53000 10.40000 14.43000
   p value 0.01270 0.00200 0.00040
neg NX/L + neg M/L 0.00123 0.25243 0.00134 0.24311 0.00163 0.28492
   F test 25.71000 20.11000 21.62000
   p value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Observations 84 80 70
R-squared 0.892 0.912 0.93
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) Growth refers to annual average growth in the period 1970 - 2005; (2) Regional Dummies are included in all specifications.   23 
Table 2.d: OLS results: Determinants of Gross Enrolment Ratio 
 
Table 2.e: OLS results: Determinants of Life Expectancy 
 
Explanatory variables: coeff. Beta coeff. Beta coeff. Beta
Net Natural Resource Exports (pos NX/L) 0.00026 0.18679 0.00012 0.07226 0.000320* 0.18069
[0.000177] [0.000194] [0.000188]
Net Natural Resource Imports (neg NX/L) -0.00007 -0.02960 0.00000 -0.00186 -0.00004 -0.01891
[0.000310] [0.000336] [0.000277]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Exporters (pos M/L) -0.000618** -0.35604 -0.000797** -0.45089 -0.00033 -0.17626
[0.000305] [0.000336] [0.000275]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Importers (neg M/L) -0.00042 -0.12466 -0.00060 -0.17468 0.00016 0.04365
[0.000444] [0.000499] [0.000556]
Gros Enrolment in 1970 -0.0136*** -0.94458 -0.0146*** -0.99961 -0.0175*** -1.07918
[0.00206] [0.00159] [0.00156]
Terms of Trade Growth -0.0376*** -0.20804 -0.0375*** -0.19903
[0.0134] [0.0122]
Executive Constraint 0.00222*** 0.35130
[0.000566]
Sum of coefficients: 
pos NX/L + pos M/L -0.00035 -0.16925 -0.00068 -0.37864 -0.00001 0.00443
   F test 1.69000 4.93000 0.00000
   p value 0.19810 0.03070 0.94950
neg NX/L + neg M/L -0.00049 -0.15426 -0.00061 -0.17654 0.00012 0.02474
   F test 1.51000 2.33000 0.08000
   p value 0.22460 0.13310 0.77420
Observations 73 66 65
R-squared 0.651 0.728 0.786
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) Growth refers to annual average growth in the period 1970 - 2005; (2) Regional Dummies are included in all specifications. 
Explanatory variables: coeff. Beta coeff. Beta coeff. Beta
Net Natural Resource Exports (pos NX/L) 0.0174** 0.19841 0.01100 0.09235 0.01380 0.11097
[0.00729] [0.00977] [0.00993]
Net Natural Resource Imports (neg NX/L) 0.00027 0.02433 -0.00275 -0.02185 -0.00069 -0.00532
[0.00748] [0.00898] [0.00947]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Exporters (pos M/L) 0.00356 -0.00948 0.00987 0.07540 0.0266** 0.19638
[0.0114] [0.0134] [0.0119]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource Importers (neg M/L) 0.00127 -0.03744 0.00874 0.05095 0.0289* 0.15890
[0.00966] [0.0144] [0.0172]
Life Expetancy in 1970 -0.0189*** -1.05483 -0.0189*** -1.20715 -0.0197*** -1.23390
[0.00164] [0.00181] [0.00176]
Terms of Trade Growth 0.23800 0.02821 -0.50100 -0.05742
[0.504] [0.510]
Executive Constraint -0.03150 -0.08682
[0.0440]
Sum of coefficients: 
pos NX/L + pos M/L 0.02096 0.18893 0.02087 0.16775 0.04040 0.30735
   F test 3.98000 2.12000 8.28000
   p value 0.04910 0.14960 0.00540
neg NX/L + neg M/L 0.00154 -0.01310 0.00599 0.02910 0.02821 0.15358
   F test 0.02000 0.18000 3.48000
   p value 0.88160 0.67490 0.06660
Observations 102 90 79
R-squared 0.803 0.788 0.865
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) Growth refers to annual average growth in the period 1970 - 2005; (2) Regional Dummies are included in all specifications.   24 
OLS (Regional interactions results) 
Table 3 replicates our main results and similarly includes HDI and its subcomponents changes as 
the dependent variable and natural resource abundance as the key variables of interest, but 
includes a set of regional interaction effects for Latin America. Similar to our previous set of 
results, all tables include a convergence variable in addition to the resource variables along with 
regional dummies.  
These new set of regressions confirm our main results that natural resource abundance has a 
positive effect on human development, since the coefficients for the net exporters of natural 
resources are positive and statistically significant for all specifications. Similarly, in analyzing 
the total effect of natural resources (the sum of the coefficients of net exports and total imports) 
on human development,  we  also  found that its effect is positive for  net resource exporting 
countries. However, the Latin America interaction effect shows that the impact of natural 
resources on human development is significantly smaller for this region compared with the rest 
of the natural resource abundant regions and countries. This result is shown in table 3, where we 
can see that the Latin America interaction coefficients are of the opposite sign and mostly 
significant. This indicates that for Latin America the positive effect of natural resources is 
relatively small and in some cases the total coefficient for the region is not significantly different 
from zero. 
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Table 3: Latin America interaction results: Determinants of HDI change 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper shows evidence against a natural resource curse on human development. We find 
evidence that changes of human development from 1970 to 2005, proxied by changes in the 
Human Development Index, are positively and significantly correlated with natural resource 
abundance. When we decompose the results for each HDI components, we find that natural 
resources could be positive for GDP growth but, most significantly, we find stronger evidence 
that natural resources are good for the non-income components of human development 
(especially literacy and life expectancy). These results contribute to a broader discussion of 
development by indicating that the positive effect of natural resource abundance is clearer for 
human development than for GDP growth, mainly through the education and health dimensions. 
Explanatory variables: coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff.
Net Natural Resource Exports (pos NX/L) 0.234*** 0.256*** 0.00102*** 0.00370* 0.0379***
[0.0214] [0.0391] [0.000290] [0.00198] [0.00512]
Net Natural Resource Imports (neg NX/L) 0.000187 0.00134 -0.000139 -0.000849*** 0.0135
[0.000221] [0.00153] [0.000316] [0.000296] [0.0106]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource 
Exporters (pos M/L) -0.199*** -0.218*** 0.000709 -0.00218*** -0.106
[0.0182] [0.0313] [0.000728] [0.000789] [0.109]
Total Imports of Net Natural Resource 
Importers (neg M/L) 6.20E-06 0.00761*** 0.00124** -0.00022 -0.0188
[0.000249] [0.00214] [0.000574] [0.000428] [0.0137]
Value in 1970 -0.0141*** -0.0168*** -0.0128*** -0.0143*** -0.0185***
[0.00275] [0.00262] [0.00195] [0.00331] [0.00176]
Dummy Latin America and the Caribbean 0.000773 -0.0152*** -0.000822 -0.00186 0.300***
[0.000609] [0.00401] [0.000736] [0.00126] [0.0494]
Interaction Latin America and Net Natural 
Resources Exports -0.234*** -0.253*** -0.000807* -0.00419* -0.0469***
[0.0217] [0.0395] [0.000408] [0.00218] [0.0166]
Interaction Latin America and Total Imports 
of Net Natural Resources Exporters 0.199*** 0.223*** -0.00118 0.000821 0.129
[0.0181] [0.0315] [0.000843] [0.000994] [0.110]
Observations 70 78 85 77 100
R-squared 0.814 0.802 0.888 0.711 0.817
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (1) Growth refers to annual average growth in the period 1970 - 2005; (2) Regional Dummies are included in all specifications. 
HDI GDP Literacy Gross Enrolment Life Expectancy  26 
We have also studied the effect of resource abundance on progress in human development in the 
Latin America region.  Results from the Latin America interactions show that the positive impact 
of natural resources on that region is significantly smaller than in the rest of the world.  Since the 
average results are still positive and significant for the rest of regions, this suggests the possible 
existence of institutional features in the region that interact with natural resources in a 
detrimental way.  Nevertheless, even in Latin America’s case there is no evidence that natural 
resources harm human development.  
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Appendix A:  Data, Variable Definitions, and Sources 




Net exports of natural resources, defined as 
exports minus imports, divided by the labor 
force. The labor force is defined as the 
population between the ages of 15 and 64.  
WDI and UN COMTRADE 
Growth of GDP 
per capita, 
1970-2005 
Average annual growth of real GDP per 
capita (constant prices:  chain series). 
Author’s Calculations based 
on Penn World Table 
(Summers, Heston, and Aten, 
2002) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
Real GDP per capita (constant prices:  chain 
series) divided by total population. 
Penn World Table (Summers, 
Heston, and Aten, 2002) 
Openness  Percentage of years with open economic 
policies as defined by Sachs and Warner 
(1995a).  
Sachs and Warner (1995a) 
Terms-of-trade 
Growth 
The Growth of external terms of trade is 
defined as the ratio of export to import price 
indices of goods and services. 
World Development 
Indicators 
HDI  A composite index measuring average 
achievement in three basic dimensions of 
human development—a long and healthy 
life, access to knowledge, and a decent 
standard of living. 
Gray and Purser (2009) 




The proportion of the adult population aged 
15 years and older that is literate.  
Gray and Purser (2009) 




The number of years a newborn infant could 
expect to live if prevailing patters of age-
specific mortality rates at the time of birth 
were to stay the same throughout the child’s 
life. 
Gray and Purser (2009) 
Human Development Report 







The number of students enrolled in primary, 
secondary, and tertiary levels of education  
Gray and Purser (2009) 
Human Development Report 
Office 
 
 
 